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INTRODUCTION
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,1
which upheld the basic right to abortion but established a new, less
protective, constitutional standard for abortion restrictions, has had
a paradoxical effect on women’s constitutional right to privacy. By re-
affirming that women have the right to make the ultimate decision
about whether to bear a child, Casey reinforced the strand of consti-
tutional privacy grounded in decisional autonomy over important per-
sonal decisions. At the same time, Casey’s “undue burden” test has
fostered extensive encroachments on women’s personal privacy.
In trying to strike an impossible compromise on abortion, the
Court in Casey opened the door to physical, familial, and spiritual in-
vasions of women’s privacy that serve little purpose but public sham-
ing and humiliation.2 The constitutional right to abortion under Casey
* Professor of Law, CUNY School of Law. J.D., New York University School of Law;
B.A., Yale University. I am grateful to the William & Mary Journal of Women and the
Law for inviting me to participate in this symposium.
1. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
2. By “public shaming” I do not mean that the shaming necessarily occurs in the
public realm, but rather that a process of shaming, or moral condemnation, is imposed
upon abortion patients by the public, through federal and state abortion laws.
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accordingly has come to reflect a thin, impoverished notion of privacy,
in which women retain the bare right to make a decision while having
nearly all facets of that decision subjected to intense scrutiny.
While the Court’s adoption of the undue burden standard in
1992 immediately enabled states to invade women’s privacy in new
ways,3 the Roberts Court has interpreted Casey expansively, to permit
even greater erosions of the privacy boundaries that once protected
the abortion decision.4 The Casey standard is amorphous enough to
allow a wide range of respect for women’s privacy.5 Now that Justice
Kennedy is the Court’s swing vote on abortion issues, he has be-
come the key interpreter of the undue burden standard.6 Gonzales
v. Carhart,7 which Justice Kennedy authored, gives us a bleak picture
of his interpretation of an undue burden and the encroachments on
privacy that the Justice Kennedy undue burden standard will permit.
This Article is organized into three parts. Part I reviews the
evolution of the constitutional right to privacy, from its articulation
in cases involving parental decision-making, to contraception, to
abortion. Part II canvasses the different facets of privacy implicated
in the abortion decision — including belief and conscience, familial
decision-making, medical decision-making, and bodily integrity — and
reviews cases in which the Supreme Court has recognized or acknowl-
edged these privacy interests. Part III describes how Casey’s undue
burden standard, although protecting women’s ultimate right to
choose abortion, has severely curtailed privacy protection for abortion,
allowing regulations that invade all of these dimensions of abortion
decision-making. The Article’s Conclusion suggests that, notwith-
standing the widespread view that privacy as a basis for protecting
abortion rights is passé (and was perhaps always ill-advised), a re-
newed focus on privacy, coupled with the newer formulations sound-
ing in liberty or autonomy, and equality, would help ensure more
robust protection of a woman’s right to terminate unwanted or un-
tenable pregnancies.
3. See Caitlin E. Borgmann, Winter Count: Taking Stock of Abortion Rights After
Casey and Carhart, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 675, 683-89 (2004) (discussing Casey’s approval
of a 24-hour waiting period and the implications of the undue burden standard).
4. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart (Carhart II), 550 U.S. 124, 132, 167-68 (2007) (uphold-
ing first-ever federal ban on certain abortion procedures, despite the ban’s similarity to
a Nebraska ban struck down by the Court in Stenberg v. Carhart (Carhart I), 530 U.S.
914 (2000)).
5. See Borgmann, supra note 3, at 678-79, 688 (noting that the Casey standard is
susceptible to judicial manipulation).
6. See Charles Lane, All Eyes on Kennedy in Court Debate on Abortion; Justice
Expected to Be Swing Vote in Ruling on Late-Term Procedure, WASH. POST, Nov. 8, 2006,
at A3 (describing Justice Kennedy’s expected role as the Court’s new swing vote on
abortion issues).
7. Carhart II, 550 U.S. 124.
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I. EVOLUTION OF THE RIGHT TO REPRODUCTIVE PRIVACY
The Supreme Court’s early articulation of reproductive privacy
had a distinctly spatial sense. In Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court
upheld the right of married couples to use contraception.8 The major-
ity opinion, by Justice Douglas, found privacy in the “penumbras” of
many different constitutional provisions,9 but in the context of the
law before the Court, the opinion emphasized the sanctity of the mar-
ital bedroom and the unseemliness of government intrusion there.
Expressing concern about how the contraception ban might be en-
forced, Douglas wrote, “Would we allow the police to search the sacred
precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contra-
ceptives? The very idea is repulsive to the notions of privacy sur-
rounding the marriage relationship.”10 This conception of the home
as a protected space, the Court noted, is echoed in express constitu-
tional provisions, such as the Third Amendment’s prohibition on the
quartering of soldiers in private homes and the Fourth Amendment’s
protection against searches and seizures.11
The Court acknowledged that the “zone of privacy” is not simply
a physical space and includes more abstract dimensions such as the
rights of association, conscience, and belief.12 More relevant to the pri-
vate marital space that the Court carved out in Griswold, the Court
noted that privacy encompasses the liberty of parents to determine
how to raise their children.13 Meyer v. Nebraska, which held that a law
forbidding the teaching of foreign languages violated parents’ right
to “bring up children,”14 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, which held
that Oregon’s compulsory public education law unconstitutionally
8. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
9. Id. at 484-86. Justice Douglas’s articulation was elaborated upon by the concurring
Justices in Griswold. See id. at 486-99 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (relying on Ninth
Amendment); id. at 499-502 (Harlan, J., concurring) (relying on Fourteenth Amend-
ment’s due process clause); id. at 502-03 (White, J., concurring) (relying on Fourteenth
Amendment’s references to “liberty” and “due process”).
10. Id. at 485-86 (majority opinion).
11. Id. at 484 (noting that these provisions establish “zones of privacy” (citing Boyd
v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886))).
12. Id. at 483. For example, the Court discussed the right of belief recognized in
Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (compulsory flag salute for
public schoolchildren violated First Amendment), and the right of political association
recognized in NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958) (compelled disclosure of
NAACP membership lists violated freedom of association), and Schware v. Board of Bar
Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 246-47 (1957) (association with Communist Party not valid
grounds to exclude lawyer from practice). Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483.
13. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482 (discussing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)).
14. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399-400.
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“interfere[d] with the liberty of parents . . . to direct the upbringing
and education of [their] children,”15 supported Griswold’s notion of
a kind of protected sphere around familial decision-making.
Seven years later, in Eisenstadt v. Baird,16 the Court shifted
abruptly to a model of privacy that emphasized individual autonomy,
in contrast to the familial or marital decision-making embraced in
Griswold.17 Eisenstadt addressed a law that forbade the distribution
of contraceptives to unmarried persons.18 Lacking the “sacred pre-
cinct” of a marital bedroom,19 the Court could not apply Griswold’s
reasoning to invalidate the law. Instead, Justice Brennan’s majority
opinion held that the law violated equal protection, since it permitted
only married couples to obtain contraception.20 The Court, applying
rational basis review, found that the differential treatment of unmar-
ried individuals served neither to deter fornication nor to protect
public health.21 It concluded that, “whatever the rights of the indi-
vidual to access to contraceptives may be, the rights must be the same
for the unmarried and the married alike.” 22
Having decided the case on equal protection grounds, the Court
then turned to privacy, where its discussion was brief, but striking:
It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy in question
inhered in the marital relationship. Yet the marital couple is not
an independent entity with a mind and heart of its own, but an
association of two individuals each with a separate intellectual
and emotional makeup. If the right of privacy means anything,
it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamen-
tally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget
a child.23
While the passage was not central to the Court’s legal analysis,
Eisenstadt has come to be identified with these words, and for good
reason.24 Roe was already on the docket when Eisenstadt was de-
cided.25 Indeed, it seemed quite clear that Justice Brennan had
15. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35.
16. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
17. Id. at 453.
18. Id. at 440-42.
19. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
20. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 454-55.
21. Id. at 447-52.
22. Id. at 453.
23. Id.
24. See DAVID J. GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE
MAKING OF ROE V. WADE 542-44 (2d ed. 1998) (discussing significance of Brennan’s
“crucial sentence”).
25. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (first argued on Dec. 13, 1971).
2010] ABORTION, THE UNDUE BURDEN STANDARD, & PRIVACY 295
deliberately inserted the privacy language in Eisenstadt to help pave
the way for the Court’s decision in Roe.26
Roe v. Wade recognized the right to abortion as encompassed by
the constitutional right to privacy.27 Given Griswold’s talk of penum-
bras, and the plethora of constitutional provisions discussed in that
opinion,28 it had been difficult for the plaintiffs in Roe to predict what
line of attack would be most persuasive. The case was argued twice.29
In the first argument, plaintiffs’ counsel, Sarah Weddington, acknowl-
edged that the plaintiffs had originally hedged their bets by invok-
ing a number of different constitutional provisions.30 By the second
argument, plaintiffs had narrowed their claims to vagueness and “the
Ninth Amendment rights of a woman to determine whether or not
she would continue or terminate a pregnancy.” 31
Relying as it had in Griswold on the right to privacy, the Court
in Roe this time settled firmly on the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause as the location of this right.32 Justice Blackmun wrote
for the seven Justice majority, “[T]he Court has recognized that a
right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of
privacy, does exist under the Constitution.” 33 “This right of privacy,”
the Court went on,
whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of
personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is,
or, as the District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment’s
reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass
a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.34
Yet, while Eisenstadt had pointed in the direction of decisional
autonomy in profoundly personal decisions, Blackmun’s opinion did
26. See GARROW, supra note 24, at 542 (describing Supreme Court clerks’ awareness
of the statement’s import); see also Nan D. Hunter, Justice Blackmun, Abortion, and the
Myth of Medical Independence, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 147, 167 (2006) (“Justice Brennan
used the opportunity . . . in Eisenstadt to build a doctrinal bridge between” the contra-
ception cases and the abortion cases.).
27. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
28. See supra note 9 (discussing the various constitutional provisions).
29. Transcript of Oral Argument, Roe, 410 U.S. 113 (No. 70-18), reprinted in 75
LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 781, 807 (Philip Kurland & Gerhard Gasper eds., 1975) (initially
argued Dec. 13, 1971, and reargued Oct. 11, 1972).
30. Id. at 788 (“We had originally brought this suit alleging both the due process
cause, equal protection clause, the Ninth Amendment, and a variety of others.”).
31. Id. at 808. The three-judge federal district court panel had enjoined the statute
on these grounds. Roe, 410 U.S. at 121-22.
32. Roe, 410 U.S. at 164.
33. Id. at 152.
34. Id. at 153 (emphasis added).
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not strongly emphasize women’s autonomy. Instead, the opinion was
oddly tentative in describing the effects of forced pregnancy, child-
birth, and parenthood upon a woman. Using a detached, passive voice
to describe these burdens, the Court wrote:
The detriment that the State would impose upon the pregnant
woman by denying this choice altogether is apparent. Specific and
direct harm medically diagnosable even in early pregnancy may
be involved. Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon
the woman a distressful life and future. Psychological harm may
be imminent. Mental and physical health may be taxed by child
care. There is also the distress, for all concerned, associated with
the unwanted child, and there is the problem of bringing a child
into a family already unable, psychologically and otherwise, to
care for it. In other cases, as in this one, the additional difficulties
and continuing stigma of unwed motherhood may be involved.
All these are factors the woman and her responsible physician
necessarily will consider in consultation.35
Aside from this single passage, women facing unintended pregnancies
were largely absent from the Court’s opinion in Roe. Insofar as the
Court acknowledged the decision to be “private,” the relevant private
realm seemed to be the doctor’s office.36 The Court focused more in-
tently on the abortion provider than the woman, referring to “the right
of the physician to administer medical treatment according to his pro-
fessional judgment,” and describing abortion as “in all its aspects . . .
inherently, and primarily, a medical decision,” for which “basic re-
sponsibility . . . must rest with the physician.” 37
35. Id.
36. See Hunter, supra note 26, at 149. Rejecting the traditional view of Roe v. Wade
as paying great deference to physicians, Nan Hunter claims that “the Justices who
decided Roe shared a liberal belief in the value of medical authority because they assumed
it to be a sphere which could operate independently of the state.” Id.
37. Roe, 410 U.S. at 165-66 (emphasis added); see also id. at 164 (holding that, in the
first trimester, “the abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical
judgment of the pregnant woman’s attending physician”) (emphasis added); id. at 163
(holding that, in the first trimester, “the attending physician, in consultation with his
patient, is free to determine . . . that, in his medical judgment, the patient’s pregnancy
should be terminated”). Many commentators have attributed Roe’s focus on the physician
as stemming from Justice Blackmun’s personal admiration for the medical profession,
given his experience as general counsel for the Mayo Clinic. See, e.g., Larry Gostin, Guest
Editor’s Introduction, 13 AM. J.L. & MED. 153, 153 (1987) (discussing Justice Blackmun’s
personal and professional relationship to the medical profession); Harold Hongju Koh,
Rebalancing the Medical Triad: Justice Blackmun’s Contributions to Law and Medicine,
13 AM. J.L. & MED. 315, 320 (1987) (“Roe v. Wade bears many of the earmarks of . . .
Justice Blackmun’s early proclivity to trust too fully in the goodness of doctors.”). But see
Hunter, supra note 26, at 148-49 (disputing this account).
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Since Roe, however, the Court’s articulation of “privacy” in
abortion decision-making (at least among the liberal Justices) has
matured to embrace Eisenstadt’s conception of personal autonomy in
major life decisions. When the Court was poised to decide Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey in 1992,38 it was
not clear that the right to abortion would survive in any form.39 But,
while the Court in Casey let stand five out of the six provisions of
the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act it considered,40 it upheld what
it called Roe’s “essential holding,” reaffirming the right to privacy as
encompassing the right to abortion.41 Moreover, the Court’s articula-
tion of the right to privacy had evolved significantly since Roe. The
joint opinion42 expressly acknowledged that “[t]he ability of women
to participate equally in the economic and social life of the Nation has
been facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive lives.” 43
It emphasized that “[t]he destiny of the woman must be shaped to a
large extent on her own conception of her spiritual imperatives and
her place in society.” 44
The Court’s framing of the right was welcomed by many as newly
attentive to the importance of reproductive freedom to women’s auton-
omy and equality.45 Reacting to the decision, Professor Laurence Tribe
38. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
39. See GARROW, supra note 24, at 688-92 (describing the political climate and changes
in the Court’s composition leading up to Casey and tensions surrounding the oral argu-
ments); Borgmann, supra note 3, at 675-76 (discussing high stakes posed by the Casey
decision); Linda J. Wharton et al., Preserving the Core of Roe: Reflections on Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 18 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 317, 319 (2006) (“As litigators for Planned
Parenthood of Southern Pennsylvania and other Pennsylvania reproductive healthcare
providers in the Casey litigation, we had awaited the day of the decision with foreboding.”).
40. The Court invalidated only the statute’s husband notification provision and the
reporting requirement relating to that provision. Casey, 505 U.S. at 898-901. It upheld
the medical emergency definition, 24-hour waiting period, parental consent requirement,
and remainder of the reporting requirements. Id. at 880-87, 899-901; see also Borgmann,
supra note 3, at 679 (discussing Casey).
41. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846, 874. But see Jamal Greene, The So-Called Right to
Privacy, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 11), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=1456026 (arguing that Casey reframed the right to abortion as rooted
in liberty, not privacy).
42. The controlling opinion in Casey was jointly authored by Justice Kennedy, Justice
O’Connor, and Justice Souter. Casey, 505 U.S. at 833.
43. Id. at 856.
44. Id. at 852.
45. See, e.g., GARROW, supra note 24, at 701 (recounting editorial and scholarly
reactions to Casey); David B. Cruz, “The Sexual Freedom Cases”? Contraception, Abortion,
Abstinence, and the Constitution, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 299, 357-58 (2000) (discuss-
ing scholarly interpretations of Casey as recognizing the gender equality implications of
abortion regulation); Wharton et al., supra note 39, at 319, 329 (noting that the Casey
joint opinion respected the connection between women’s reproductive liberty and their
autonomy and equality); Linda Greenhouse, The Supreme Court: A Telling Court Opinion,
N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 1992, at A1 (“In contrast to the emphasis in Roe v. Wade on the
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exclaimed, “This opinion makes sense and puts the right to abortion
on a firmer jurisprudential foundation than ever before.” 46 Justice
Blackmun, who had partially dissented in Casey and argued for up-
holding Roe’s original strict scrutiny framework,47 later praised the
Casey joint opinion for its “robust view of individual liberty and the
equal protection undertone.” 48
II. PRIVACY AND ABORTION
Casey’s new conception of the right to privacy, while welcomed
by many abortion rights supporters, was nevertheless somewhat
cramped. In emphasizing the equality and autonomy aspects of the
right to privacy, the Casey joint opinion seemed far less concerned
about protecting the abortion decision from lesser governmental in-
trusions than in ensuring that women retain the ultimate choice of
whether to terminate their pregnancies.49 For example, the Court
invalidated Pennsylvania’s husband notification provision because it
found that this restriction would be an insurmountable obstacle for
some women:
The spousal notification requirement is thus likely to prevent
a significant number of women from obtaining an abortion. It does
not merely make abortions a little more difficult or expensive to
obtain; for many women, it will impose a substantial obstacle.
We must not blind ourselves to the fact that the significant number
of women who fear for their safety and the safety of their children
are likely to be deterred from procuring an abortion as surely as
if the Commonwealth had outlawed abortion in all cases.50
medical and social hierarchy of abortion, this opinion placed the question of women’s
ability to control their reproductive lives in the context of modern doctrines of equality.”).
46. Greenhouse, supra note 45, at A1.
47. Casey, 505 U.S. at 922, 929-30 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
48. Wharton et al., supra note 39, at 342 (quoting The Harry A. Blackmun Oral History
Project, Interview by Harold Hongju Koh, Professor, Yale Law School, with Justice Harry
Blackmun in New Haven, Conn., at 504 (June 20, 1995) (available in The Harry A.
Blackmun Papers, Library of Congress, Madison Building, Manuscript Division)).
49. See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 877 (“What is at stake is the woman’s right to make
the ultimate decision, not a right to be insulated from all others in doing so.”); Borgmann,
supra note 3, at 684, 687-88 (arguing that the joint opinion suggests that only restric-
tions that are tantamount to a ban on abortion for some or all women constitute an
undue burden).
50. Casey, 505 U.S. at 893-94. The joint opinion did suggest, although by no means
unequivocally, that “undue burdens” might include certain lesser hindrances, including
“significant” or “real” health risks, id. at 879-80, 886, and sufficient financial burdens,
id. at 901. Nevertheless, other than the husband notification and related reporting pro-
visions, the Court found that none of the Pennsylvania statute’s provisions imposed a
substantial obstacle. See supra note 40 (summarizing outcome of Casey decision).
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This narrow focus on women’s right to make the ultimate decision
about abortion embraced autonomy at the expense of more tradi-
tional understandings of privacy. Indeed, some have suggested that
Casey essentially abandoned privacy as a basis for abortion rights
in favor of liberty.51
But when it comes to important personal decisions such as abor-
tion or sexual intimacy, there is no distinct and obvious line between
liberty and privacy. In Eisenstadt, Justice Brennan linked the two
concepts when he declared, “[i]f the right of privacy means anything,
it is the right of the individual . . . to be free from unwarranted gov-
ernmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person
as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.” 52 Justice Kennedy
opened his majority opinion in Lawrence v. Texas with a depiction
of liberty as tightly interwoven with privacy:
Liberty protects the person from unwarranted government
intrusions into a dwelling or other private places. In our tradition
the State is not omnipresent in the home. And there are other
spheres of our lives and existence, outside the home, where the
State should not be a dominant presence. Freedom extends be-
yond spatial bounds. Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that
includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain inti-
mate conduct. The instant case involves liberty of the person both
in its spatial and in its more transcendent dimensions.53
In Casey, Justices Stevens and Blackmun drew this same connection
between liberty and privacy. In his partial concurrence and dissent,
Justice Stevens noted, “[t]he woman’s constitutional liberty interest
also involves her freedom to decide matters of the highest privacy
and the most personal nature.” 54 Justice Blackmun’s partial concur-
rence and dissent similarly explained how the right to privacy encom-
passes a right to make “critical life choices” free from governmental
interference.55 Blackmun criticized Chief Justice Rehnquist for failing
to see how rights of personal liberty “are grounded in a more general
right of privacy.” 56
51. See, e.g., Greene, supra note 41 (manuscript at 11) (noting that “[t]he right to
privacy is mentioned just twice in the [Casey] joint opinion”).
52. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
53. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003).
54. Casey, 505 U.S. at 915 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see
also id. at 919 (“A woman who has, in the privacy of her thoughts and conscience, weighed
the options and made her decision cannot be forced to reconsider all, simply because the
State believes she has come to the wrong conclusion.”).
55. Id. at 926-28 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
56. Id. at 940.
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Abortion is one of the most personal, intimate decisions a woman
can make, as several Supreme Court Justices have recognized. In
his concurrence in Roe, Justice Stewart observed:
“Certainly the interests of a woman in giving of her physical and
emotional self during pregnancy and the interests that will be
affected throughout her life by the birth and raising of a child are
of a far greater degree of significance and personal intimacy than
the right to send a child to private school . . . or the right to teach
a foreign language . . . .” 57
In City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Justice
Powell described the decision as a “highly personal choice.” 58 Dissent-
ing in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, Justice Blackmun
referred to “the quintessentially intimate, personal, and life-directing
decision whether to carry a fetus to term.” 59 He added:
As we recently reaffirmed[,] . . . few decisions are “more basic to
individual dignity and autonomy” or more appropriate to that
“certain private sphere of individual liberty” that the Constitution
reserves from the intrusive reach of government than the right to
make the uniquely personal, intimate, and self-defining decision
whether to end a pregnancy.60
The abortion decision has both ethical and medical dimensions.
Each of these dimensions evokes privacy concerns, and the combina-
tion of these elements into one decision only raises the intensity of
the privacy at stake.61 Abortion implicates many different facets of
57. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 170 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring) (quoting Abele v.
Markle, 351 F. Supp. 224, 227 (D. Conn. 1972)) (citations omitted).
58. City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 420 n.1 (1983),
overruled by Casey, 505 U.S. 833.
59. Webster v. Reprod. Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490, 538 (1989) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
60. Id. at 548-49 (quoting Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists,
476 U.S. 747 (1986)). Justice Scalia has scoffed at his colleagues’ references to privacy
and intimacy, arguing that these are manipulable phrases used to disguise subjective
judgments favoring a right to abortion. See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 983 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (accusing colleagues of “rattl[ing] off a collection of adjectives that simply
decorate a value judgment and conceal a political choice”); see also Roe, 410 U.S. at 172
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“A transaction resulting in an operation such as this is not
‘private’ in the ordinary usage of that word.”).
61. End-of-life decision-making raises a similar fusion of ethical and medical pri-
vacy concerns. See infra text accompanying notes 104-08. But cf. B. Jessie Hill, The
Constitutional Right to Make Medical Treatment Decisions: A Tale of Two Doctrines, 86
TEX. L. REV. 277, 325-26 (2007) (arguing that “it is no answer to say that in one case a
constitutional right is involved and in another no such right is involved. The abortion
cases present the same issue as the public-health cases: whether individuals have the
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privacy, including but also going beyond the basic right to make an
autonomous decision. These dimensions include belief and conscience,
familial decision-making, medical decision-making, and bodily in-
tegrity.62 In this Part, I discuss cases in which the Supreme Court
has recognized or acknowledged these privacy interests. The case
law has not always clearly established these as constitutionally pro-
tected under a “right to privacy.” My object here is simply to flesh out
the myriad ways in which recognized privacy concerns pervade the
abortion decision, regardless of whether that decision is constitution-
ally protected under a rubric of privacy, liberty or autonomy,63 or
equality.64 Moreover, as a matter of fact, the Roe framework did pro-
tect these aspects of the abortion decision, whether or not the Court
explicitly acknowledged it.65 Casey, on the other hand, dramatically
narrowed the scope of privacy protection for abortion, as I discuss in
Part III.
A. Belief and Conscience
While the right to make a decision does not necessarily guarantee
a private “space” within which to make that decision, the Court has
in some contexts implicitly acknowledged the importance of such a
(virtual) space in recognizing a right of conscience and belief. In his
powerful dissenting opinion in Olmstead v. United States, Justice
Brandeis emphasized the importance of individual freedom to deter-
mine one’s own moral code:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions
favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the signif-
icance of man’s spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect.
They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions
right, in consultation with a physician, to protect their health and to make medical
treatment choices without unwarranted government interference”).
62. See infra Part III (discussing how abortion restrictions permitted under Casey
interfere with the belief and conscience, familial decision-making, medical decision-making,
and bodily integrity dimensions of the abortion decision).
63. See, e.g., Greene, supra note 41 (manuscript at 11-13) (arguing that “liberty”
provides a better foundation for abortion rights and describing the Supreme Court’s shift
away from privacy and toward liberty and autonomy in abortion cases).
64. See, e.g., Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV.
955, 1002-28 (1984) (arguing that laws governing reproduction, including laws restricting
abortion, implicate equality concerns and proposing a test to determine when such laws
violate equality norms); Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective
on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 347-80
(1992) (employing historical and critical perspectives to analyze abortion-restrictive
regulation in an equal protection framework).
65. See infra text accompanying notes 118-23 (discussing how Roe protected privacy
interests in the context of abortion).
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of life are to be found in material things. They sought to protect
Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and
their sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the
right to be let alone — the most comprehensive of rights and the
right most valued by civilized men.66
In Stanley v. Georgia, the Supreme Court relied on this famous pas-
sage in addressing the right to possess pornography in the home.67
In unanimously holding that the First and Fourteenth Amendments
prohibited criminalizing the private possession of “obscene material”
in the home, the Court declared, “Our whole constitutional heritage
rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control men’s
minds.” 68 The Court based its decision on the “fundamental . . . right
to be free, except in very limited circumstances, from unwanted gov-
ernmental intrusions into one’s privacy.” 69 In a concurring opinion
in Brandenburg v. Ohio,70 Justice Douglas remarked, “[o]ne’s beliefs
have long been thought to be sanctuaries which government could not
invade. . . . and government has no power to invade that sanctuary
of belief and conscience.” 71
As discussed in Part I, in Eisenstadt, the Court extended its
earlier recognition of a right to privacy in belief and conscience to
the reproductive rights context when it recognized the right of indi-
viduals to use contraception.72 Some Supreme Court Justices have
rightly observed that the abortion decision likewise strongly impli-
cates this aspect of privacy. For example, in Thornburgh v. American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, Justice Stevens empha-
sized the importance of self-determination in a woman’s abortion
decision-making, stating that “no individual should be compelled to
surrender the freedom to make that decision for herself simply be-
cause her ‘value preferences’ are not shared by the majority.” 73
66. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting),
overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and Berger v. New York, 388
U.S. 41 (1967).
67. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969).
68. Id. at 565.
69. Id. at 564.
70. 395 U.S. 444, 445-47, 449 (1969) (holding that a speech at a Ku Klux Klan rally
could not constitutionally be punished as incitement where it was not “directed to inciting
or producing imminent lawless action”).
71. Id. at 456-57 (Douglas, J., concurring) (emphases added).
72. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972); see supra notes 17-23 and accom-
panying text (discussing Eisenstadt).
73. Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. Of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 777 &
n.5 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“What a person is, what he wants, the determination
of his life plan, of his concept of the good, are the most intimate expressions of self-
determination, and by asserting a person’s responsibility for the results of this self-
determination we give substance to the concept of liberty.” (quoting CHARLES FRIED,
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A woman who must decide whether to have an abortion or
whether to bring a new person into the world makes a significant
moral decision.74 She weighs her conception of the moral worth of the
fetus with her other moral commitments. Perhaps she has existing
children for whom she could not adequately care if she were to bear
another child. Perhaps she is young, financially dependent upon her
parents, and in the midst of pursuing her education. In that case,
she may honor commitments to herself and to her parents to become
self-sufficient before starting a family. Whatever choice a woman
makes, she draws upon her own moral framework and her own con-
scientious beliefs.75
The joint opinion in Casey recognized that the abortion decision
involves the exercise of belief and conscience, although it did not
fully honor this recognition in its application of the undue burden
standard.76 The Court acknowledged the different moral frameworks
within which a woman might either seek out or avoid pregnancy:
One view is based on such reverence for the wonder of creation
that any pregnancy ought to be welcomed and carried to full term
no matter how difficult it will be to provide for the child and en-
sure its well-being. Another is that the inability to provide for
the nurture and care of the infant is a cruelty to the child and an
anguish to the parent. These are intimate views with infinite vari-
ations, and their deep, personal character underlay our decisions
[regarding contraception]. The same concerns are present when
the woman confronts the reality that, perhaps despite her attempts
to avoid it, she has become pregnant.77
RIGHT AND WRONG 146-47 (1978))), overruled by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833 (1992); Charles Fried, Correspondence, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 288, 288-89
(1977) (“[T]he concept of privacy embodies the ‘moral fact that a person belongs to himself
and not others nor to society as a whole.’ ”); see also RONALD DWORKIN, IS DEMOCRACY
POSSIBLE HERE? 10 (2006) (stating that “the principle of personal responsibility . . . holds
that each person has a special responsibility for realizing the success of his own life, a
responsibility that includes exercising his judgment about what kind of life would be
successful for him”).
74. See Margaret Olivia Little, Abortion and the Margins of Personhood, 39 RUTGERS
L.J. 331, 332, 342-46 (2008) (discussing the moral status of an embryo or fetus and the
moral significance of abortion at different stages of pregnancy).
75. See Caitlin E. Borgmann, The Meaning of ‘Life’: Belief and Reason in the Abortion
Debate, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 551, 593-607 (2009) (discussing moral dimensions of
the abortion decision); Caitlin Borgmann & Catherine Weiss, Beyond Apocalypse and
Apology: A Moral Defense of Abortion, 35 PERSP. ON SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 40, 42-43
(2003) (same); Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection: Abortion Restrictions
Under Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694, 1796-1800 (2008) (arguing for the importance
of respecting women’s dignity and self-sovereignty in making the abortion decision).
76. See infra Part III.A (discussing the ways in which cases interfere with a woman’s
beliefs and conscience). Most significantly, the Court upheld Pennsylvania’s so-called
“informed consent” and waiting period provision. Casey, 505 U.S. at 881-87.
77. Casey, 505 U.S. at 853.
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Moreover, the Court emphasized the importance of women arriving
at these moral positions without government coercion:
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices
a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dig-
nity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to
define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe,
and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters
could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed
under compulsion of the State.78
The Justices added, “The destiny of the woman must be shaped to
a large extent on her own conception of her spiritual imperatives and
her place in society.” 79
B. Privacy in Familial Decision-making
While the Court has been far from consistent in how it treats
privacy in family decision-making,80 it has acknowledged in a number
of contexts the importance of privacy in making decisions regarding
the family and intimate relationships. In Washington v. Glucksberg,
the Court catalogued these different familial contexts and the privacy
right recognized in each.81 The Court recognized, in Meyer and Pierce,
the right to direct the upbringing and education of children;82 in
Loving v. Virginia, the right to marry;83 in Skinner v. Oklahoma, the
right to have children;84 in Griswold, the right to marital privacy;85
and in Eisenstadt, the right to use contraception regardless of marital
status.86 Since Glucksberg was decided, the Court issued Lawrence v.
Texas, in which the Court relied upon these same decisions in recog-
nizing the right to privacy in same-sex intimacy.87
78. Id. at 851.
79. Id. at 852.
80. See David D. Meyer, The Paradox of Family Privacy, 53 VAND. L. REV. 527, 528-29,
548-49 (2000) (describing incoherence of the Court’s treatment of family privacy rights,
despite its “rhetoric consistently exalting the fundamental nature of these rights”).
81. 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997).
82. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510, 534-35 (1925).
83. 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
84. 316 U.S. 535, 536 (1942).
85. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
86. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443, 453-55 (1972).
87. 539 U.S. 558, 573-74 (2003). The Court did not clearly state the constitutional
basis for its decision (whether privacy, equality, or other grounds). Yet the Court un-
questionably recognized the privacy concerns at stake and the disturbing implications
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The abortion decision likewise implicates familial decision-
making because many, if not most, women will not make their de-
cision wholly independently, but instead will seek the advice of their
spouse or partner, a parent, or another family member.88 The Court
in Casey expressly identified “the right to make family decisions” as
one of the “more general rights under which the abortion right is
justified.” 89 The Court thus recognized the appropriateness of situ-
ating the abortion decision within the Court’s other cases on family
decision-making. For example, the joint opinion noted that “[o]ur
law affords constitutional protection to personal decisions relating
to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child
rearing, and education.” 90 Likewise, the opinion acknowledged that
“[o]ur precedents ‘have respected the private realm of family life
which the state cannot enter.’” 91 These passages suggest that pri-
vacy encompasses not only the individual’s right to make a personal,
morally weighty decision about abortion free from excessive govern-
ment intrusion and coercion, but a protected space for family decision-
making within which the government generally should not intrude.
C. Privacy in Medical Decision-making
The Court has demonstrated respect for privacy in medical
decision-making contexts outside of abortion, even if this recognition
has not always been sufficient to overcome asserted state interests.92
Where it has found a state interest in public health or safety, the
Court has often deferred to the state’s factual claims about medical
concerns and has not applied heightened scrutiny to regulations that
infringe individuals’ medical decision-making.93 In the abortion
of government intrusion into this realm. Id. But see Greene, supra note 41 (manuscript
at 3, 12) (arguing that Lawrence eschews “privacy” in favor of “liberty” as the basis for
its decision).
88. E.g., AMANDA DENNIS ET AL., GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, THE IMPACT OF LAWS
REQUIRING PARENTAL INVOLVEMENT FOR ABORTION: A LITERATURE REVIEW 6 (Mar. 2009),
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/ParentalInvolvementLaws.pdf (“[A]pproximately 60%
of minors say their parents know about their pregnancy and desire to have an abortion,
even in states without parental involvement laws.”).
89. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992); see also id. at
896 (stating that abortion laws touch “upon the private sphere of the family”).
90. Id. at 851.
91. Id. (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1994)) (emphasis added).
92. See Hill, supra note 61, at 329-32 (arguing that “the Supreme Court has already
recognized a substantive-due-process right to make medical treatment choices,” but that
“courts have avoided recognizing and properly analyzing this right” by deferring inappro-
priately to legislative findings of medical fact).
93. See id. at 282-85, 302-04 (discussing cases including Jacobson v. Massachusetts,
197 U.S. 11 (1905) (mandatory vaccination laws); United States v. Oakland Cannabis
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context, however, Roe ensured stronger protection for the doctor-
patient relationship.94 As the Court stressed in Roe, abortion impli-
cates not only the moral issue of whether to terminate a pregnancy
but also medical decision-making.95 Nan Hunter has suggested that
Justice Blackmun deliberately emphasized the medical aspect of the
abortion issue because he and his colleagues in the Roe majority
assumed that medical practice existed within a sphere that was rela-
tively safe from government interference. “More than any deference
to or identification with physicians,” Hunter asserts, “the Justices who
decided Roe shared a liberal belief in the value of medical authority
because they assumed it to be a sphere which could operate independ-
ently of the state.” 96
This assumption eventually turned out to be wrong with regard
to abortion, as Casey whittled away the protections Roe had built
around the doctor-patient relationship.97 But under the Roe frame-
work, the Court was skeptical even of measures ostensibly aimed at
promoting women’s health. For example, in Doe v. Bolton, the com-
panion case to Roe, the Court invalidated a number of abortion re-
strictions, including a hospital accreditation requirement and hospital
abortion committee approval, as “unduly restrictive of the patient’s
rights.” 98 The Court emphasized the importance of protecting physi-
cian discretion and judgment in order to protect abortion patients’
well-being.99 In Akron, the Court struck down a law that purported to
ensure that women gave their informed consent before an abortion,100
and in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, the Court
invalidated a ban on use of the saline amniocentesis method of abor-
tion.101 Even after fetal viability, the Court required that abortion re-
strictions be sufficiently deferential to physician judgment to ensure
Buyers’ Coop., 532 U.S. 483 (2001) (medical marijuana); United States v. Rutherford, 442
U.S. 544, 552 (1979) (terminally ill patients’ access to drug Laetrile); Whalen v. Roe, 429
U.S. 589 (1977) (state prohibition on certain prescription drugs)).
94. See id. at 294-95 (arguing that the Court’s “public health” cases have proceeded
on a separate theoretical track from “autonomy” cases such as abortion, and arguing for
a unified approach to medical treatment cases).
95. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 116-17 (1973).
96. Hunter, supra note 26, at 149, 194-95 (stating that, for Justices who decided Roe,
“medicine helped to define what was private, with doctors serving as border patrols”).
97. See infra Part III (discussing Casey’s erosions of the Roe framework); see also
Hunter, supra note 26, at 195-96 (describing how “[t]he Court’s delegation of power [to
medical authority] ultimately failed” as an increasingly conservative Court began to
withdraw its protection of the doctor-patient relationship).
98. 410 U.S. 179, 193-98 (1973).
99. Id. at 192, 199-200.
100. City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 426 (1982),
overruled by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
101. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75-79 (1976).
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that women’s health was not compromised. Thus, for example, in
Colautti v. Franklin, the Court struck down a viability-determination
provision on the grounds that the statute’s vague wording imper-
missibly constrained physicians’ discretion.102
But abortion is much more than a mere medical issue. The fact
that abortion is also a morally significant decision enhances the
private nature of the medical decisions women must make regard-
ing their abortions.103 In Glucksberg, Justice Stevens, concurring in
the judgments, made a similar point regarding end-of-life medical
decision-making.104 He noted,
[S]ome state intrusions on the right to decide how death will be
encountered are also intolerable. . . .
. . . Cruzan did give recognition, not just to vague, unbridled
notions of autonomy, but to the more specific interest in making
decisions about how to confront an imminent death. . . . The
liberty interest at stake in a case like this differs from, and is
stronger than, both the common-law right to refuse medical treat-
ment and the unbridled interest in deciding whether to live or die.
It is an interest in deciding how, rather than whether, a critical
threshold shall be crossed.105
A similar fusion of moral and medical concerns arises in the contra-
ception cases, where the primary concern is pregnancy prevention,
but where medical issues also abound.106
Of course, even under Roe’s protective framework, recognizing
privacy in medical decision-making did not foreclose all possibility of
state regulation for the sake of public health.107 As the Court noted
in Akron, “[t]his does not mean that a State never may enact a regu-
lation touching on the woman’s abortion right during the first weeks
of pregnancy. Certain regulations that have no significant impact on
the woman’s exercise of her right may be permissible where justified
by important state health objectives.”108
102. 439 U.S. 379, 390-97 (1979).
103. But see Hill, supra note 61, at 325-26 (arguing that medical aspects of abortion
decision should be treated no differently than medical decision-making in other contexts).
104. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 745 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring in
judgments).
105. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in judgments).
106. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (referring to the im-
portance of physician’s role in prescribing contraception); Hill, supra note 61, at 306-09
(discussing public health aspects of Griswold and Eisenstadt).
107. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973) (stating that before viability the state
could regulate abortion to extent that such regulation is “reasonably related” to promoting
maternal health).
108. City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 430 (1983).
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D. Bodily Integrity
Under common law, the right to bodily integrity was strongly pro-
tected. In Union Pacific Railway Co. v. Botsford, the Court declared,
“[n]o right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the
common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and
control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of
others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.”109 Con-
stitutionally, the cases have not been as consistent. In Schmerber v.
California, for example, the Court upheld the forced drawing of blood
for purposes of an alcohol-analysis test.110 In Washington v. Harper,
the Court upheld the right of the state under certain circumstances
to administer anti-psychotic drugs to a prison inmate against his will,
even as the Court admitted that “[t]he forcible injection of medi-
cation into a nonconsenting person’s body represents a substantial
interference with that person’s liberty.”111 Yet in Rochin v. California,
the Court struck down the use of forced stomach pumping to produce
evidence of illegal drugs, referring to the procedure as “breaking
into the privacy of the petitioner.”112 Similarly, in Winston v. Lee, the
Court invalidated the use of compelled surgery to remove a bullet for
evidentiary purposes, proclaiming that such an “intrusion into an
individual’s body . . . implicates expectations of privacy . . . of such
magnitude that the intrusion may be ‘unreasonable’ even if likely to
produce evidence of a crime.”113 In Buck v. Bell, the Court upheld the
involuntary sterilization of the “feeble-minded,”114 while in Skinner
v. Oklahoma, the Court struck down the compulsory sterilization of
certain criminals.115
Concededly, the Court made clear in Roe that the Supreme Court
has never recognized “an unlimited right to do with one’s body as one
pleases.”116 Nevertheless, the Court has recognized that state en-
croachments on a person’s bodily integrity must be justified by an
appropriately weighty governmental interest. The Casey joint opin-
ion specifically identified “physical autonomy” as one of the “general
rights” under which abortion is subsumed.117
109. 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) (holding the judge to be without authority under the
common law to order a plaintiff in a personal injury suit to undergo surgical examination).
110. 384 U.S. 757, 761, 772 (1966).
111. 494 U.S. 210, 229, 236 (1990).
112. 342 U.S. 165, 166, 172, 174 (1952).
113. 470 U.S. 753, 759, 766-67 (1985).
114. 274 U.S. 200, 205, 207 (1927).
115. 316 U.S. 535, 536-38 (1942).
116. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (citing Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S.
11 (1905); Buck, 274 U.S. 200)).
117. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992); see also id. at
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III. PRIVACY ENCROACHMENTS UNDER THE UNDUE BURDEN
STANDARD
Privacy in all of the above manifestations is eviscerated by Casey’s
undue burden standard, especially as interpreted by Justice Kennedy.
While the Casey decision itself is primarily responsible for this shift,
the Court in Roe partially (if inadvertently) paved the way. Under Roe,
the abortion decision was made in a protected space, one that existed
from the moment of conception to the point of fetal viability. While
the state could legislate regarding the time prior to fetal viability in
order to protect women’s health, it could not otherwise encroach on
her decision-making in any way.118 It could not moralize, or attempt
to convince the woman to choose childbirth, or shame the woman for
her choice.119 It could not act to protect the embryo or fetus.120
Yet, while Roe’s standard effectively carved out this protected
realm, and while some of the Court’s language supported the concept
of such an inviolate sphere, other language in Roe suggested potential
limits to the woman’s privacy in decision-making regarding abortion:
The pregnant woman cannot be isolated in her privacy. She
carries an embryo and, later, a fetus . . . . The situation therefore
is inherently different from marital intimacy, or bedroom posses-
sion of obscene material, or marriage, or procreation, or educa-
tion . . . . [I]t is reasonable and appropriate for a State to decide
that at some point in time another interest, that of health of the
mother or that of potential human life, becomes significantly
involved. The woman’s privacy is no longer sole and any right of
privacy she possesses must be measured accordingly.121
896 (asserting that state regulation of abortion implicates “the very bodily integrity of
the pregnant woman”).
118. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163. The state was permitted to regulate abortion after the first
trimester in order to promote women’s health. Id. However, the main encroachments on
the abortion decision traditionally have been grounded in moral opposition to abortion,
not in a desire to protect women’s health. Caitlin E. Borgmann, Judicial Evasion and
Disingenuous Legislative Appeals to Science in the Abortion Controversy, 17 J.L. & POL’Y
15, 31, 33 (2008) [hereinafter Judicial Evasion]; see Borgmann, supra note 75, at 561
(noting that commentators have observed a shift in anti-abortion rhetoric from focusing
on the fetus’s personhood to concentrating on the woman’s mental and physical health).
But see Judicial Evasion, supra, at 31, 33 (discussing post-Casey trend in which morally
based abortion legislation is presented as scientifically based and in furtherance of women’s
well-being); Reva B. Siegel, Lecture, The Right’s Reasons: Constitutional Conflict and the
Spread of Woman-Protective Antiabortion Argument, 57 DUKE L.J. 1641, 1657 (2008)
(discussing strategic transition from “argu[ing] the moral and political case against
abortion in fetal-focused terms” to “woman-centered” claims).
119. See City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 443-44 (1983)
(striking down an Ohio “informed consent” law on grounds that it was designed to
dissuade a woman from undergoing an abortion, rather than to inform her consent).
120. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 164 (holding that the state may act to further its interest in
the fetus only after viability).
121. Id. at 159 (citation omitted).
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However, the Court determined that the stage at which the state’s
interest in the fetus became sufficiently compelling to invade the
woman’s privacy was fetal viability.122 By confining the time period
of permissible morally based intrusion to the post-viability period,
in which exceedingly few abortions are performed, the Court greatly
reduced the potential for clashes between the government’s interest
in the fetus and the woman’s privacy.123 The protected domain for
abortion decision-making under Roe therefore remained significant.
Casey abruptly invaded this space by changing the standard for
abortion. In one of its major departures from Roe, Casey held that the
state has a legitimate and important interest in the fetus from the
very inception of pregnancy.124 The Court found that Roe’s trimester
framework “undervalue[d] the State’s interest in potential life.”125
This of course created a dilemma for the three authors of the joint
opinion, who claimed to uphold Roe, because the two interests it now
recognized — that of a woman in terminating her pregnancy and that
of the state in protecting the embryo or fetus — are seemingly dia-
metrically opposed.126 However, the joint opinion emphasized that
before viability the state could not employ its interest in the fetus to
stop, or even unduly burden, women seeking abortions.127 Thus, the
Justices explained, “the means chosen by the State to further the
interest in potential life must be calculated to inform the woman’s
free choice, not hinder it.”128
At the same time, by formally acknowledging the state’s role in
pre-viability abortion decision-making, Casey opened the door and
invited the state into the private space that, under Roe, protected
122. Id. at 163-64.
123. Borgmann, supra note 3, at 690.
124. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846, 870-73 (1992).
125. Id. at 873.
126. See Borgmann, supra note 3, at 689-93 (detailing the ways in which Casey’s
expanded recognition of the state’s interest in the embryo or fetus imperils the woman’s
interest); see also Casey, 505 U.S. at 986-87 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Any regulation of
abortion that is intended to advance what the joint opinion concedes is the State’s
‘substantial’ interest in protecting unborn life will be ‘calculated [to] hinder’ a decision
to have an abortion.”); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 421
n.1 (1983) (“[T]he dissent would uphold virtually any abortion-inhibiting regulation
[including a twenty-four-hour waiting period] because of the State’s interest in preserving
potential human life. . . . This analysis is wholly incompatible with the existence of the
fundamental right recognized in Roe v. Wade.”). But see Siegel, supra note 75, at 1737-38
(pointing out that state’s interest in “potential life” is not necessarily concerned with
preserving particular fetal lives, and describing other potential interpretations).
127. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 878 (holding that the state may not enact legislation with
the purpose or effect of placing a “substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking
an abortion before” viability).
128. Id. at 877.
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women’s decisions about abortion.129 The joint opinion maintained
that the presence of an embryo or fetus distinguishes abortion from
other personal decisions and renders the abortion decision undeserv-
ing of a “zone of privacy.” The Justices wrote:
What is at stake is the woman’s right to make the ultimate
decision, not a right to be insulated from all others in doing so.
Regulations which do no more than create a structural mecha-
nism by which the State, or the parent or guardian of a minor,
may express profound respect for the life of the unborn are
permitted, if they are not a substantial obstacle to the woman’s
exercise of the right to choose. Unless it has that effect on her
right of choice, a state measure designed to persuade her to choose
childbirth over abortion will be upheld if reasonably related to
that goal.130
Casey’s characterization of abortion as not solely a private concern
finds its echo in Roe’s claim that the abortion decision is “inherently
different” from other significant, personal moral decisions, including
marital intimacy or even procreation.131
With Justice O’Connor’s retirement, Justice Kennedy now serves
as the Court’s swing vote on abortion issues.132 It is therefore largely
his interpretation of the undue burden standard that currently gov-
erns abortion regulation in the United States. Justice Kennedy’s inter-
pretation of the standard appears to be quite expansive. As this Part
describes, Casey, as interpreted by Justice Kennedy, gives unprece-
dented weight to the state’s interest in the embryo or fetus, thereby
permitting all manner of encroachments on the privacy of women
seeking abortion. Thus, more than two decades after Casey, women
still retain the formal right to obtain an abortion, but the decision has
significantly changed the landscape surrounding decision-making
on abortion.
A. Interference with Belief and Conscience
Although Casey does not allow the government to force a woman
to choose childbirth, it makes clear that it is the government’s
129. See Borgmann, supra note 3, at 693 (noting that Casey “granted the state far
broader latitude” to hinder abortion access from the beginning of pregnancy).
130. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877-78 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
131. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973).
132. Compare Stenberg v. Carhart (Carhart I), 530 U.S. 914, 956 (2000) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that Court should have upheld Nebraska “partial-birth abortion”
ban) with Gonzales v. Carhart (Carhart II), 550 U.S. 124, 132 (2007) (authoring majority
opinion upholding federal “partial-birth abortion” ban).
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prerogative to try to “persuade the woman to choose childbirth over
abortion.”133 The way in which the government has exercised this
prerogative is through so-called “informed consent” laws.134 These laws
require that abortion providers convey, either orally or via written
materials, information compiled by the government with the goal of
convincing women to reject abortion.135 Earlier versions of such laws
required women to receive nominally objective, though selectively
chosen, information, such as the gestational age of the fetus and de-
pictions of fetuses at various anatomical stages.136 This type of law
was originally declared unconstitutional in Akron, which was decided
under the strict scrutiny framework established in Roe.137 Casey over-
ruled this portion of Akron, not only sanctioning the earlier informed
consent laws but inviting innovation and experimentation as states
continue to test the boundaries of what the “undue burden” standard
will bear.138
New versions of “informed consent” legislation, for example, re-
quire that women be offered the opportunity to view ultrasounds of
their fetuses or even to undergo an ultrasound and simultaneously
hear a description of the ultrasound from the technician performing
it.139 Others require that abortion providers deliver a homily about
the biological and spiritual significance of the fetus.140 A South Dakota
law requires physicians to tell their abortion patients “[t]hat the
133. Casey, 505 U.S. at 878 (“To promote the State’s profound interest in potential life,
throughout pregnancy the State may take measures to ensure that the woman’s choice
is informed, and measures designed to advance this interest will not be invalidated as long
as their purpose is to persuade the woman to choose childbirth over abortion.”).
134. See Robert Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A First Amendment Analysis of
Compelled Physician Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 939, 941-42 (2007) (describing South
Dakota’s “informed consent” law for abortion).
135. Chinué Turner Richardson & Elizabeth Nash, Misinformed Consent: The Medical
Accuracy of State-Developed Abortion Counseling Materials, GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV.,
Fall 2006, at 6, 6-7, available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/gpr/09/4/gpr090406.pdf
(describing abortion “informed consent” laws and the biased and inaccurate information
they mandate be distributed).
136. Judicial Evasion, supra note 118, at 35. But see City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for
Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 444-45 (1983) (taking issue with supposed neutrality of
information conveyed by “informed consent” requirement before the Court).
137. Akron, 462 U.S. at 444-45.
138. See Borgmann, supra note 3, at 705 (arguing legislatures may perceive Casey as
an invitation to experiment with abortion restrictions).
139. Carol Sanger, Seeing and Believing: Mandatory Ultrasound and the Path to a
Protected Choice, 56 UCLA L. REV. 351, 357-58, 375-76 (2008) (describing and citing
mandatory ultrasound laws); see also infra note 196 and accompanying text (discussing
Oklahoma’s mandatory ultrasound law).
140. The South Dakota law that takes this approach does not overtly identify the moral
or religious significance of the fetus, but the law’s import is obvious. See Judicial Evasion,
supra note 118, at 35-43 (discussing South Dakota law) (citations omitted); Post, supra
note 134, at 941-42 (also discussing South Dakota law).
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abortion will terminate the life of a whole, separate, unique, living
human being.”141
In its recent decision in Gonzales v. Carhart (Carhart II), which
upheld the federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003,142 the
Court hinted that it might approve laws designed to warn women of
the purported risk that they will regret their abortions. In an opinion
authored by Justice Kennedy, the Court declared,
While we find no reliable data to measure the phenomenon,
it seems unexceptionable to conclude some women come to re-
gret their choice to abort the infant life they once created and
sustained. . . .
In a decision so fraught with emotional consequence some
doctors may prefer not to disclose precise details of the means
that will be used, confining themselves to the required statement
of risks the procedure entails. . . .
It is, however, precisely this lack of information concerning
the way in which the fetus will be killed that is of legitimate con-
cern to the State. . . . The State has an interest in ensuring so
grave a choice is well informed.143
It seems likely that some lower courts will interpret this dictum in
Carhart II as expanding the scope and quality of the information
the state can force the woman to consider,144 and indeed the Eighth
Circuit has already done so in upholding the South Dakota law.145
Laws like South Dakota’s, and indeed even the earlier “informed
consent” laws, do more than simply attempt to ensure that women
make fully informed, voluntary decisions. Rather, they insert the gov-
ernment as an advocate into the woman’s decision-making process
and attempt to influence her “innermost thoughts”146 and (re)shape
her moral view to match that of the state. The Court in Akron recog-
nized the difference between ordinary conceptions of informed consent
and “informed consent” that campaigns for one position:
It remains primarily the responsibility of the physician to ensure
that appropriate information is conveyed to his patient, depending
141. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1(1)(b) (2009).
142. Gonzales v. Carhart (Carhart II), 550 U.S. 124, 159-60 (2007). In Carhart I, the
Supreme Court held that a nearly identical Nebraska ban violated the “undue burden”
standard under Casey. Stenberg v. Carhart (Carhart I), 530 U.S. 914, 938-39 (2000).
143. Carhart II, 550 U.S. at 159.
144. See Judicial Evasion, supra note 118, at 28 (discussing how Carhart II paved the
way for more intrusive “informed consent” requirements).
145. Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 735, 738 (8th Cir.
2008); Judicial Evasion, supra note 118, at 37-40 (discussing Rounds).
146. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 454 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring) (describing
an investigator who “roams at will through all of the beliefs of the witness, ransacking
his conscience and his innermost thoughts”).
314 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW                  [Vol. 16:291
on her particular circumstances. [Our] recognition [in Danforth]
of the State’s interest in ensuring that this information be given
will not justify abortion regulations designed to influence the
woman’s informed choice between abortion or childbirth.147
Mandatory ultrasound laws similarly intrude upon a woman’s
decision-making about her pregnancy in an effort to convince her
not to choose abortion. Carol Sanger points out:
What . . . is the purpose of requiring ultrasound for women who
do not intend to remain pregnant? The answer seems clear: to
produce a confrontation, whether actual or notional, between the
pregnant woman and her fetus that will result in a change of
heart regarding the abortion. . . .
. . . Mandatory ultrasound disrupts the law’s traditional
respect for privacy, bodily integrity, and decisional autonomy in
matters of such intimacy as reproduction, pregnancy, and family
formation. It is harassment masquerading as knowledge.148
The Court has not done a good job of explaining why the govern-
ment should be allowed to try to talk women out of abortions. It is
hard to imagine that the Court would tolerate a law under which
pregnant women were forced to hear a government-mandated script
urging them to have abortions.149 The interest that the Court has rec-
ognized as justifying so-called “informed consent” laws is its interest
in “potential life.”150 But it is not self-evident what this interest en-
compasses and why it should override the pregnant woman’s interests
in making her decision privately. As Reva Siegel notes, “Remarkably
little attention has been devoted to clarifying the character of govern-
ment’s interest in restricting abortion to protect potential life.”151
147. City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 443-44 (1983); see
also Post, supra note 134, at 941-42 (distinguishing traditional medical informed consent
doctrine from abortion laws such as South Dakota’s “informed consent” statute).
148. Sanger, supra note 139, at 359-60.
149. In counterpoise is the woman’s constitutional interest in liberty. One aspect
of this liberty is a right to bodily integrity, a right to control one’s person.
This right is neutral on the question of abortion: The [sic] Constitution would
be equally offended by an absolute requirement that all women undergo abor-
tions as by an absolute prohibition on abortions. “Our whole constitutional
heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control
men’s minds.” The same holds true for the power to control women’s bodies.
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 915 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1965))
(citations omitted).
150. Casey, 505 U.S. at 881-83 (joint opinion).
151. Siegel, supra note 75, at 1746-47 (offering several possible explications of the
government’s interest including pronatalist, eugenic, life-saving, moral and expressive,
and political).
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Regardless, as Justice Kennedy interprets Casey, these startling intru-
sions into women’s moral decision-making on abortion are likely not
sufficient to constitute an “undue burden” on the woman’s decision.152
B. Intrusions into Family Decision-making
The privacy of minors seeking an abortion is particularly vul-
nerable under the Court’s abortion precedents, which have upheld
laws that force teenagers to involve their parents in their abortion
decisions even though such mandated involvement can be dangerous
for some minors.153 While these laws are often pitched as enhancing
family communications, evidence shows that teenagers are equally
likely to involve their parents when no such law applies.154 Contrary
to their stated purpose, these laws can instead intrude on the decision-
making of custodial parents. For example, in states that require the
involvement of both parents,155 teenagers may be forced to contact
parents from whom they are estranged or who are abusive.156 If the
second parent cannot be found, or if the teenager and her custodial
parent deem it unwise to contact that parent, the minor is forced to
seek permission through the court system, even though her custodial
parent supports her decision.157
In most states that require parental involvement, the minor’s only
way around the requirement is to seek permission from a judge.158
Minors who are subject to psychological or physical abuse at home
and who are therefore afraid to consult their parents must instead re-
veal intimate details to a judge.159 Some of these judges are morally
opposed to abortion and either routinely deny permission or berate
minors in the courtroom.160 While the proceedings are required to
152. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 883 (“[R]equiring that the woman be informed of . . . infor-
mation relating to fetal development and the assistance available should she decide to
carry the pregnancy to full term is a reasonable measure to ensure an informed choice . . . .
This requirement cannot be considered a substantial obstacle . . . .”).
153. HELENA SILVERSTEIN, GIRLS ON THE STAND: HOW COURTS FAIL PREGNANT MINORS
13, 15 (2007) (relating the American Medical Association’s conclusion that some minors
would be endangered by such laws but noting the Supreme Court has upheld these pro-
visions so long as they included a bypass alternative).
154. DENNIS ET AL., supra note 88, at 6.
155. See, e.g., Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 424-25, 448, 450 (1998) (upholding
such a law in light of its judicial bypass mechanism).
156. SILVERSTEIN, supra note 153, at 13-14.
157. See id. at 27-28 (noting that three states require both parents’ involvement and
petitions to bypass this requirement nearly always must be heard by a court).
158. Id. at 15.
159. See id. at 13, 15, 27-28 (recognizing that some minors may be in abusive homes,
and describing judges’ discretion in judicial bypass proceedings).
160. See id. at 65, 84-85 (recounting phone interviews with court employees in Tennessee
and Alabama who said their judges are pro-life and refuse to grant abortions to minors).
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respect minors’ confidentiality,161 the reality — especially in small
towns — is that it can be difficult for minors to negotiate the judicial
process and make their court appearance without someone recog-
nizing them.
While it might seem logical that minors’ health care decision-
making should be more heavily regulated than that of adults, abor-
tion restrictions are an anomaly in regulations concerning minors’
access to sensitive medical care. Most states recognize that mandat-
ing parental involvement for sensitive medical treatment will risk
deterring many minors from seeking care at all.162 Accordingly, as the
Guttmacher Institute reports, “The legal ability of minors to consent
to a range of sensitive health care services — including sexual and
reproductive health care, mental health services and alcohol and
drug abuse treatment — has expanded dramatically over the past
30 years.”163 Minors in most states can consent to services including
contraception, prenatal care, and treatment for sexually transmitted
infection.164 In many states, minors can even relinquish their children
for adoption and consent to medical care for their children.165
Parental involvement requirements were held permissible even
under the Roe framework, provided they did not give parents an abso-
lute veto over a minor’s abortion decision.166 But Casey’s application
of the undue burden standard to Pennsylvania’s parental consent pro-
vision underscored the standard’s elasticity and the Court’s tendency
to tolerate invasions of privacy with which it is less sympathetic.167
For example, the Court recognized the inappropriateness of interfer-
ing in spousal communications when there could be domestic violence
involved.168 This conclusion contrasted starkly with the Court’s re-
fusal to acknowledge that minors likewise can be subjected to abuse
if they are either forced to consult their parents about their abor-
tions or if their clandestine decisions to obtain an abortion with court
permission are uncovered.169 Thus, while the Court was unwilling to
161. See id. at 33 (quoting TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-10-304(g) (2001)).
162. GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: AN OVERVIEW OF MINORS’
CONSENT LAW (2009), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib
_OMCL.pdf.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. E.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 639-40 (1979) (opinion of Powell, J.) (stat-
ing that properly drafted laws requiring parental consent or notice for abortion are
constitutional).
167. Borgmann, supra note 3, at 683.
168. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 888-94 (1992).
169. See Borgmann, supra note 3, at 683-85 (contrasting the Casey joint opinion’s
approach to Pennsylvania’s husband notification with its treatment of the parental
involvement requirement).
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tolerate governmental intrusion into the marital relationship, it was
untroubled by intrusions into parent-child relations, even in the face
of evidence that such intrusions could seriously harm minors.170
C. Intrusions into Medical Decision-making
State intrusions on medical decision-making have typically been
justified as promoting public health or safety.171 Few abortion mea-
sures, however, can truly be defended as necessary for public health.
First, their proponents’ clear motive is to hinder abortion access, not
to promote women’s health.172 While anti-abortion-rights advocates
often cast proposed restrictions as beneficial to women’s health and
well-being, these claims are mere rhetoric designed to make the re-
strictions politically more palatable.173 Second, as discussed below,
these restrictions invade women’s privacy, do not in fact promote
women’s health, and may in some cases impose serious health risks
on women.
In many states, abortion providers are targeted with onerous and
discriminatory facility regulations, purportedly to safeguard women’s
health.174 These laws are commonly referred to as Targeted Regulation
of Abortion Providers, or TRAP laws.
TRAP laws are generally defined as laws that single out physi-
cians’ offices and outpatient clinics where abortions are performed,
and subject them to wide-ranging medical, administrative, and
facility requirements that are not imposed on comparable medical
facilities. . . . [Some of these] laws require offices of physicians
that provide abortions to obtain licenses from state health de-
partments, even though medical offices and clinics in general are
typically not licensed. . . . [Some impose] formalized administrative
170. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 895 (declaring that invalidation of husband notification
provision is not inconsistent with upholding parental involvement laws based on the
“quite reasonable assumption that minors will benefit from consultation with their
parents”); see also SILVERSTEIN, supra note 153, at 12-13 (documenting the risks of
parental abuse when teenagers are forced to tell their parents about their decisions to
seek an abortion).
171. See Hill, supra note 61, at 282-85, 302-04 (discussing cases in which government
intrusions on medical decision-making were defended on public health grounds).
172. See Memorandum from James Bopp, Jr. & Richard E. Coleson, Pro-Life Strategy
Issues 6 (Aug. 7, 2007), available at http://www.montanacc.org/directors_pages/PDFs/
10March08/BoppMemo-re-ProlifeStrategy1.pdf (communicating the views of two attorneys
influential in the anti-abortion-rights movement and describing various abortion restric-
tions as serving to change “hearts and minds” and to encourage opposition to all abortions).
173. Id.; Judicial Evasion, supra note 118, at 34-35; Reva B. Siegel, The New Politics
of Abortion: An Equality Analysis of Woman-Protective Abortion Restrictions, 2007 U.
ILL. L. REV. 991, 992-93 (2007).
174. Amalia W. Jorns, Note, Challenging Warrantless Inspections of Abortion Providers:
A New Constitutional Strategy, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1563, 1568 (2005).
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practices and policies that might not otherwise be in place, or
would have been conducted informally; training and qualification
specifications for staff members; mandatory testing of patients
for sexually transmitted diseases, even if unnecessary for their
treatment; requiring employees to submit to physical examina-
tions; and requirements regarding the physical design and func-
tion of the clinic itself. These facility requirements can involve
such a degree of specificity that they have been described as
“micromanaging everything from elevator safety to countertop
varnish to the locations of janitors’ closets.” Finally, certain TRAP
laws authorize state health departments to inspect the offices and
medical records of abortion providers who are subject to these
licensing schemes without a warrant or probable cause to search.175
While TRAP laws are often defended as public health measures, in
fact, their underlying intent is to force abortion clinics to shut down.176
By meddling so deeply in abortion practice, TRAP laws infringe
the privacy of women seeking abortions. Many of the provisions over-
ride medical judgment and discretion with no discernable benefit
to patients. Some intrude more directly on women’s privacy, for in-
stance by calling for unnecessary testing177 or by allowing warrantless
searches of abortion facilities and private abortion records.178 They
can also hamper access to abortion services by increasing the costs
of operating a clinic.179 Nevertheless, these laws have been upheld
under Casey’s undue burden standard.180
175. Id. (citations omitted); see CTR. FOR REPROD. RIGHTS, TARGETED REGULATION OF
ABORTION PROVIDERS: AVOIDING THE “TRAP,” 1, 2-4 (2003), available at http://reproductive
rights.org/sites/crr.civicactions.net/files/documents/pub_bp_avoidingthetrap.pdf (providing
numerous examples of these laws).
176. See Memorandum from James Bopp, Jr. & Richard E. Coleson, supra note 172,
at 6 (anti-abortion strategy memo, referring to benefits of “ ‘incremental’ efforts” to
eliminate abortion, including “clinic regulations (which often shut down clinics)”).
177. See S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. 61-12 § 304(B)-(C) (requiring that certain laboratory
tests be administered prior to the abortion procedure, including “[d]etermination of
Rh factor (including the Du variant when the patient is Rh negative)” and “testing for
Chlamydia and gonorrhea”).
178. See Jorns, supra note 174, at 1570-71 (describing “significant patient privacy
concerns” posed by warrantless inspections of abortion providers).
179. See, e.g., Greenville Women’s Clinic v. Bryant, 222 F.3d 157, 159 (4th Cir. 2000)
(rejecting claims of increased costs as a basis for invalidating South Carolina TRAP law).
180. See id. (upholding South Carolina’s TRAP law as promoting “the health and
appropriate care of women seeking abortions”); Gillian E. Metzger, Abortion, Equality,
and Administrative Regulation, 56 EMORY L.J. 865, 871-75 (2007) (describing difficulty
of challenging TRAP laws under Casey); Jorns, supra note 174, at 1572-76 (same). But
see B. Jessie Hill, Reproductive Rights as Health Care Rights, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER &
L. 501, 546-47 (2009) (arguing for a right-to-health framework that “would invoke
heightened security for TRAP laws”); Jorns, supra note 174, at 1590 (proposing that a
Fourth Amendment purpose-based doctrine be extended to the warrantless search pro-
visions of TRAP laws).
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As discussed in Part III.A, some state legislatures use so-called
“informed consent” laws to control the physician-patient dialogue.181
South Dakota’s informed consent law requires doctors to tell abor-
tion patients that the abortion will “ ‘terminate[ ] the life of a whole,
separate, unique, living human being.’ ”182 While South Dakota has
defended this statement as simply conveying accurate, scientific in-
formation to the abortion patient, the law’s clear purpose is to force
abortion providers to transmit the state’s own moral judgment on
abortion.183 Abortion providers promptly challenged this law in fed-
eral court, alleging in part that it violated their freedom of speech.184
In Planned Parenthood Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota v.
Rounds, the Eighth Circuit ruled that the requirement was permis-
sible because, although “the State cannot compel an individual simply
to state the State’s ideological message,” it can require doctors “to
provide truthful, non-misleading information relevant to a patient’s
decision to have an abortion, even if that information might also en-
courage the patient to choose childbirth over abortion.”185 In reaching
this conclusion, the Court in Rounds relied upon Justice Kennedy’s
expansive reading of the undue burden standard in Carhart II.186
Fetal pain measures are another example of laws that impede
physician discretion and intrude on the doctor-patient relationship.187
As Harper Jean Tobin argues,
Fetal pain provisions are purportedly aimed at encouraging women
to request anesthetic to make the procedure more humane. How-
ever, legislative histories and the laws’ proponents suggest another
purpose: to shock women choosing abortion into abandoning that
choice. Even if their aim is not actually to frighten and discourage,
false or misleading fetal pain provisions are just as objectionable
as those addressing, for example breast cancer risk. They may
unnecessarily exacerbate the anxiety women feel during and after
the abortion and anesthetic measures carry a real risk of compli-
cations for the patient.188
181. Judicial Evasion, supra note 118, at 34-40.
182. Hill, supra note 180, at 540 n.166 (quoting Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D.
v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 726 (8th Cir. 2008) (en banc) and citing the South Dakota
informed consent statute).
183. Id. at 539-40.
184. Id.
185. Rounds, 530 F.3d at 734-35; see also Judicial Evasion, supra note 118, at 39-40
(discussing Rounds).
186. Rounds, 530 F.3d at 734-35.
187. See Harper Jean Tobin, Confronting Misinformation on Abortion: Informed
Consent, Deference, and Fetal Pain Laws, 17 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 122, 140-49 (2008)
(discussing and analyzing fetal pain laws in context of medical informed consent prin-
ciples). Several states have passed such laws, and Congress has considered a fetal pain
measure, the Unborn Child Pain Awareness Act of 2006. Id. at 141 n.169.
188. Id. at 148 (citations omitted).
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Some of these laws attempt to dissuade a woman from having an
abortion by requiring that she be informed that, “[b]y 20 weeks’ gesta-
tion, the unborn child has the physical structures necessary to experi-
ence pain.”189 Some states require doctors to administer anesthesia to
the fetus if the woman consents.190 While the laws requiring this infor-
mation purport to provide “value-neutral, scientific information,” they
are in fact aimed at making women reconsider their decision to end
the pregnancy by conjuring an image of fetuses as morally indistin-
guishable from babies.191 What is not reflected in the information is
the uncertainty within the scientific community regarding whether
and when these fetuses actually do perceive pain.192 Laws that require
physicians to offer to anesthetize the fetus go beyond mere intrusion
into the doctor-patient dialog. These laws encourage the administra-
tion of a procedure that is not without medical risks to the women,
not for health and safety reasons but to discourage abortions.
Ultrasound requirements similarly insert the state into the
provider-patient relationship by co-opting the abortion provider to
deliver the state’s anti-abortion message.193 Some states require that
a physician perform an ultrasound on the fetus before it is aborted
and that the woman complete a form acknowledging either that
she has viewed the ultrasound or that the physician offered her the
chance to do so and she refused.194 “The core and motivating belief
[behind these statutes] is that a woman who sees her baby’s image
on a screen will be less likely to abort.”195 Oklahoma’s law mandates
that an ultrasound be performed, and while the woman may avert her
eyes, she is forced to listen to the technician describe what the ultra-
sound shows.196 It is far from clear whether these laws would be held
unconstitutional under Casey, especially under Justice Kennedy’s
interpretation of that decision.
Abortion procedure bans are yet another vehicle for govern-
ment intervention into medical decision-making. In the late 1990s,
189. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 20-16-1103, -1105 (2005); see Judicial Evasion, supra note
118, at 43-45 (describing fetal pain laws and the motives underlying them).
190. ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-1104 (2005).
191. Judicial Evasion, supra note 118, at 44.
192. See id. at 45 (“Although the laws purport to reflect scientific research showing that
fetuses may experience pain after a certain stage of pregnancy, the scientific community
is divided on this claim.”).
193. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-330 (2007) (outlining the information a physician
is required to provide a patient prior to performing the requested abortion).
194. Sanger, supra note 139, at 357-58.
195. Id. at 358.
196. OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-738.3b (2009). This law has been enjoined by a state trial
court as violating the Oklahoma Constitution’s “single-subject” requirement. An appeal
is pending. Center for Reproductive Rights, Nova Health Systems. v. Henry (OK), http://
reproductiverights.org/en/case/nova-health-systems-v-henry-ok (last visited Jan. 24, 2010).
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numerous states passed so-called “partial-birth abortion” bans, laws
that purported to ban a single abortion method but in fact were much
broader in scope.197 As with other abortion restrictions, the bans were
presented in part as protecting women’s health.198 Other state inter-
ests cited in support of these bans included “concern for the life of
the unborn,”199 “prevent[ing] cruelty to partially born children,” 200
“preserv[ing] the integrity of the medical profession,” 201 and “pro-
tect[ing] fetal dignity by fending off a ‘coarsening’ of the culture that
would lead to widespread indifference to the lives of newborns and
‘all vulnerable and innocent human life.’ ” 202 However, it is well-
documented that the bans were deliberately created as part of a
political strategy to appeal to moderates on the abortion issue, while
gradually whittling away the ultimate right to choose abortion.203 In
fact, the bans potentially endangered women’s health by forbidding
doctors to use procedures that might well be the safest for some
women and by failing to include an exception allowing the banned
methods to be used when necessary to protect a woman’s health.204
In 2007, the Supreme Court upheld a federal ban virtually iden-
tical to the Nebraska ban the Court had invalidated in 2000.205 Justice
Kennedy wrote the majority opinion, demonstrating that his inter-
pretation of the undue burden standard now controls and that the
standard permits the government to micromanage the medical details
197. See Stenberg v. Carhart (Carhart I), 530 U.S. 914 (2000) (striking down Nebraska’s
ban as imposing an undue burden because it prohibited too many procedures and lacked
a health exception); see also Judicial Evasion, supra note 118, at 47-53 (describing
“partial-birth abortion” bans).
198. Judicial Evasion, supra note 118, at 26, 49-50 (describing findings underlying the
federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003); see also Borgmann, supra note 3, at 700
(“Although the ‘partial-birth abortion’ bans’ proponents argue that the procedure they
claim to target is never medically necessary and in fact is sometimes dangerous to women,
this has never been the professed motive for the bans.”).
199. Carhart I, 530 U.S. at 930.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Judicial Evasion, supra note 118, at 29-30 (quoting Gonzales v. Carhart
(Carhart II), 550 U.S. 124, 157 (2007)).
203. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 118, at 1651-52 (documenting and analyzing shift to
“woman-protective” anti-abortion argument); Cynthia Gorney, Gambling with Abortion,
HARPER’S MAGAZINE, Nov. 2004, at 33, 39, 41-42 (discussing political strategy behind
“partial-birth abortion” bans); Memorandum from James Bopp, Jr. & Richard E. Coleson,
supra note 172, at 6 (advocating incrementalist strategy for banning abortion in order to
“change hearts and minds”); see also Caitlin E. Borgmann, Rethinking Judicial Deference
to Legislative Fact-Finding, 84 IND. L.J. 1, 21-24 (2009) (describing the legislative push
in the 1990s to ban so-called “partial birth abortion” as a public relations campaign
intended to foster public outrage against abortion generally).
204. See Carhart I, 530 U.S. at 932 (discussing Nebraska’s failure to demonstrate that
“banning [the partial-birth abortion procedure] without a health exception may not create
significant health risks for women”).
205. Carhart II, 550 U.S. at 156.
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of abortion without a clear public health or safety rationale.206 More-
over, Justice Kennedy approved such a restriction even though it did
not clearly vindicate the state’s interest in the fetus, since according
to the state (and the Court), the ban would not prevent a single abor-
tion from occurring but instead would merely require doctors to use
other methods.207
These kinds of restrictions no longer need to be justified as public
health or safety measures. Under Roe, pre-viability regulation of abor-
tion was permissible only if it advanced these goals.208 But the myriad
new encroachments on medical decision-making are now permissible
thanks to Casey’s recognition of a state interest in the fetus sufficient
to justify intrusive abortion regulations at all stages of pregnancy.
D. Violations of Bodily Integrity
Some would argue that any law designed to pressure or coerce
a woman into continuing an unwanted or untenable pregnancy vio-
lates her bodily integrity.209 Even under a narrower conception of
bodily integrity, it is clear that several of the new abortion restrictions
directly invade the sanctuary of a woman’s body. TRAP laws that re-
quire unnecessary testing and laws that give a woman no choice but
to submit to an ultrasound subject a woman to physical interventions
without regard to whether she or her physicians thinks it in her best
medical interests. Likewise, abortion procedure bans force doctors
to tailor their methods to vindicate not the woman’s safety but some
vaguely articulated moral indignation on the part of the state.210
206. See Judicial Evasion, supra note 118, at 50 (quoting Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 195
F.3d 857, 878 (7th Cir. 1999) (Posner, J., dissenting) (“These statutes do not seek to
protect the lives or health of pregnant women, or of anybody else. . . . But as banning
“partial birth” abortions is not intended to improve the health of women . . . it cannot be
defended as a health regulation.”)).
207. Carhart II, 550 U.S. at 181 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
208. As Justice Stewart, concurring in Roe v. Wade, noted:
[Among] [t]he asserted state interests [for the challenged abortion law]
are protection of the health and safety of the pregnant woman . . . . These are
legitimate objectives, amply sufficient to permit a State to regulate abortions
as it does other surgical procedures . . . . But such legislation is not before
us, and I think the Court today has thoroughly demonstrated that these state
interests cannot constitutionally support the broad abridgment of personal
liberty worked by the existing Texas law.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 170-71 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring).
209. Borgmann, supra note 75, at 603; see, e.g., Judith Jarvis Thomson, A Defense of
Abortion, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 47, 53 (1971) (arguing that abortion should be permitted
even if the fetus is a person, since a woman has a right to defend her body against the
invasion of an unwanted pregnancy).
210. See supra notes 198-202 and accompanying text (discussing asserted state interests
supporting “partial-birth abortion” bans).
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Women may be forced to resort to a different, and perhaps more un-
comfortable or emotionally traumatic, abortion procedure,211 or to
undergo the injection of substances into the uterus in order to ensure
fetal demise before an abortion.212 Fetal pain laws so far do not man-
date that a doctor anesthetize a fetus against an abortion patient’s
will. Even so, the biased and misleading way in which these laws
present information to women seeking abortion furnishes a subtle
coercion.213 What woman would refuse fetal anesthesia upon being
told in so many words that her “unborn child” will otherwise suffer
during an abortion?
Abortion restrictions that utilize the woman’s own body to pres-
sure her not to exercise her right to abortion are particularly invidious
violations of bodily integrity. In the early stages of pregnancy, women
can deliberate privately about whether to continue the pregnancy
because they usually do not feel or look pregnant.214 Mandatory ultra-
sounds undermine a woman’s feeling of control regarding the pro-
foundly personal and disruptive, if not frightening, circumstance of
an unintended pregnancy.215 “Mandatory ultrasound is meant to solid-
ify the idea of a child so that the norms of maternal solicitude and
protection begin to take hold.” 216 Required ultrasounds, then, use a
woman’s body to conjure an image of the fetus as a baby in order to
convince the woman that she is already a mother and that she should
continue with the pregnancy. Fetal pain measures similarly make
a physically intrusive claim upon the woman’s body in order to vivify
the state’s moral message opposing abortion. If all of these measures
are ultimately upheld under the undue burden standard, it will be
thanks to Casey’s expanded solicitude for the state’s interest in the
embryo or fetus.217
211. But see David J. Garrow, Significant Risks: Gonzales v. Carhart and the Future
of Abortion Law, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 33-34 (predicting that Carhart II will not have
a significant impact on abortion practice).
212. See Carhart II, 550 U.S. at 147 (discussing potential use of digoxin injections as
a way to evade bans’ proscriptions); Garrow, supra note 211, at 31-34 (arguing that
“Gonzales v Carhart [sic] has done little more than require the modest number of
physicians who perform intact D&Es to utilize in all late second-trimester procedures
an injection protocol that most of them already used and that credible clinical studies
hold to be completely safe”).
213. See Tobin, supra note 187, at 148-49 (describing the emotional trauma fetal pain
laws can impose on women).
214. Sanger, supra note 139, at 382.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 383.
217. But cf. Neal Devins, How Planned Parenthood v. Casey (Pretty Much) Settled the
Abortion Wars, 118 YALE L.J. 1318, 1336-37 (2009) (“The few states that have pushed the
Casey boundaries have not succeeded in spurring on a wave of stringent antiabortion
regulation. . . . Outside of partial-birth abortion, where two states (Louisiana and
Nebraska) enacted partial-birth bans that mirrored the federal law approved in [Gonzales
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CONCLUSION: THE PARADOX OF PRIVACY UNDER THE UNDUE
BURDEN STANDARD
Abortion is not the only medical context in which a state may
intrude on privacy concerns without the need to justify its regulations
as related to public health or safety. In the right-to-die cases, states
have asserted justifications including the protection of the integrity
of the medical profession, protection of vulnerable patients, and pro-
tection of life.218 However, in the abortion context, the Roe framework
provided that pre-viability laws could not be justified on any grounds
other than the woman’s health. Thus, it was Casey that opened the
door to other, morally based government justifications for pre-viability
regulations of abortion that do not impose substantial obstacles to
abortion access.
The “compromise” that Casey struck is an untenable one. Casey
held that the state may regulate abortion throughout pregnancy, even
for the sole purpose of vindicating its interest in the embryo or fetus,
so long as these restrictions are “truthful and not misleading” and
do not prevent a woman from obtaining an abortion.219 This encour-
aged legislatures to pass abortion restrictions in fact based on moral
norms but couched as grounded in scientific evidence.220 Although the
regulations discussed in this Article do not directly prevent a woman
from getting an abortion, they sharply invade women’s privacy in
making a decision about abortion. Justice Kennedy, however, seems
willing to tolerate such intensely intrusive restrictions on the abortion
decision so long as women are still assured the ultimate choice.221
Women must now go through a kind of public shaming in order
to “earn” their abortions. They are forced to endure state-scripted
speeches from their physicians conveying the state’s claim that an
abortion kills a child.222 They are told that the abortion will make that
v.] Carhart, states do not see the Court’s apparent shift on abortion rights as a rallying
call to enact a new wave of stringent antiabortion restrictions.”).
218. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728, 731 (1997) (discussing the
legitimate interests promoted by the state’s ban on physician-assisted suicide).
219. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992) (“The fact that
a law which serves a valid purpose, one not designed to strike at the right itself, has the
incidental effect of making it more difficult or expensive to procure an abortion cannot
be enough to invalidate it.”).
220. Judicial Evasion, supra note 118, at 56.
221. See Borgmann, supra note 3, at 702 (discussing Justice Kennedy’s later opinion
in Carhart II, in which he “openly displayed virulent personal revulsion at abortion,”
“point[ed] an accusing finger at Justice O’Connor . . . [and] gave every impression of a
Justice who had been lured into joining Casey’s controlling opinion on the assumption
that the decision would rarely interfere with states’ discretion in enacting abortion
restrictions”).
222. But see Borgmann, supra note 75, at 586-99 (questioning the consistency and
credibility of claims that abortion is tantamount to murder).
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child suffer pain. Women are urged to see an ultrasound of the fetus
in order to confront face to face the purported child they are killing.
Thus, although Casey strongly affirmed the woman’s right to
make the ultimate choice about whether to have a child, Casey also
sanctioned measures that open up the woman’s decision to all kinds
of public scrutiny. At the same time, according to Casey, that scrutiny
can never directly achieve its proponents’ goals of halting abortions.
Under the undue burden standard itself, any restrictions that directly
prevent women from getting abortions are unconstitutional.223 So all
of these measures are ultimately senseless, permissible only if they
fail their fundamental purpose.
Many scholars have argued that reliance on privacy as a basis
for the right to abortion was never wise.224 Many were also glad to
see Casey reframe the right in terms of equality and autonomy.225 It
seems, though, that the cost of winning Casey is that women have pro-
tection for the ultimate abortion decision, but almost no protected
zone of privacy in which to make that decision. Perhaps the right to
abortion would benefit from renewed attention to the more familiar
sense of privacy — not just privacy as an awkward and unsuitable
synonym for equality, liberty, or autonomy in a minimally decisional
sense, but privacy as a protected space within which a person can
make these kinds of important moral decisions without interference
from the state.226
223. Casey, 505 U.S. at 874 (“Only where state regulation imposes an undue burden
on a woman’s ability to make this decision does the power of the state reach into the
heart of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.”).
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the right to abortion); Greene, supra note 41 (manuscript at 1) (“ ‘Privacy’ again? I’m afraid
so, but I come to bury the benighted doctrine, not to praise it.”) (internal citation omitted).
225. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text (describing favorable reactions to
Casey opinion).
226. See Borgmann, supra note 75, at 599-607 (“It is likely that the law can never
sufficiently capture the thick conceptions of life and motherhood in order to dictate whether
a particular abortion is morally permissible.”).
